
Tasmin Spargo wrote a wonderful little book, back in 1999 tracing the relationship between Michel Foucault’s work and what was then current queer theory. It is an excellent analysis, tracing the positive and negative aspects of Foucault’s work on queer theorists writing at the end of the last century. That, however, was over twenty years ago and queer theory, and what it means to use the word ‘queer’ have moved on considerably. On rereading the book, I was particularly struck by just how dated some of it appeared to be.
So where are we up to with queer? Or, perhaps, more importantly, where does queer go next? What is the future of queer? I am not sure that I, or anybody else for that matter, is really able to answer this question. However, the relating of queer to Foucault, and reflecting on what queer means in the contemporary world, did set off a series of interesting lines of thought.
The first reflection takes me to the debate between essentialism and social constructionism. Foucault was, of course, the prophet of social constructionism. It almost seemed, at the end of the last century, that essentialism was dead and that Foucault’s view, or some version of it, had won the day. That, however, is far from reality, especially in the light of contemporary gender wars.
We all now recognise the distinction between sex and gender, although I still remember a time when even that was controversial. Gender is socially constructed. But what about sex? Gender critical feminists still retain an essentialist line on this, whether they base sex on biology or on legal definitions. What matters is that there is an externally defined, biological, ‘sex’ and that all human beings are either male or female (although even here there is a middle category that is seldom discussed). What is interesting, however, at least to me, is that there appears to be an equally essentialist thread in some trans thinking, especially in the rather glib view that an individual sees themselves as ‘essentially’ of the opposite sex to the one they were born into. Again there appears to be a classification into two categories at this point, male but ‘essentially female, or female but ‘essentially’ male, although the middle ground, those who claim the identity of ‘gender fluid’, is so much larger and apparently growing.
The problem with essentialism, or rather, one problem with essentialism, is that it is so closely linked to classification. It is the attempt to provide clear, non-porous, boundaries to our social categories, whether we accept the category we have been put into or we don’t, that leads to the search for essentialist (external, otherly verified) bases for our classifications. We do this with gender/sex, we still, to some extent, do this with race and we do it with other categories, including disability, religion and sexuality.
Spargo argues, at least in part, that it was a rejection of the category of ‘gay’ that led to explorations of ‘queer’. I remember reading a little yellow book, ‘Anti-Gay’, in the early nineteen nineties, edited by Mark Simpson, and being so excited. I never felt fully comfortable with ‘gay’ stereotypes and this presentation of the idea of being ‘gay’ without having to be ‘gay’ was something that spoke to me. It was out of this ambiguity, and the rejection of the categorisation gay/straight, or even lesbian/straight, that the idea and theory of ‘queer’ emerged.
Spargo tells the story, very succinctly, about how queer theorists cleared a space for themselves within the growing debates around sexuality and gender at the end of the last century. Now queer is itself a contested term, too ambiguous for many, not analytical enough for real theory, and used far too loosely and with very little meaning by so many diverse commentators. It seems to have little content apart from the idea of fluidity and the rejection of the gay/straight:lesbian/straight dichotomies.
It is little wonder, given the vagueness and ambiguous nature of the alternatives, that essentialism is making a comeback. People want something more solid to hold on to. They like order. They crave certainty. Of course, there is more to it than this, especially in relation to gender, where the notion of male violence becomes a central player. In all this, however, queer is getting lost even among those for whom it might appear to be a rather attractive option.
From a personal point of view I am vehemently opposed to categorisation and classification, especially of people. We are each unique, and no matter what identities we may claim, the particular mix that forms our own individuality appears in no other person. I am, therefore, far more on the side of Foucault and social constructionism, but social constructionism has never really been about the individual, or really about identity. We are all more or less male, more or less female, more or less homosexual, more or less straight, etc. We are more or less queer. Classification, categorisation, essentialism, social constructionism, even gay, lesbian, straight, and queer, are terms that have a role in the stories we tell ourselves as a society (and they will also vary from person to person). They have no place in establishing identity. The individual person interacts with other individual persons. Separating the myths (stories) we live by, and our own sense of, and personal expression of, our identity, is, however, a difficult thing to achieve. In all this, despite all this, I do think queer has a place, and it remains a term, a category even, that I am proud to inhabit.